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What Wing et al. (2) themselves did about relative dose is not clear to us. In their paper, no description was apparent, nor did we recognize any consideration of background radiation or routine emissions, both strong features of our overall analysis. We assume that they made use of our estimates of radiation distribution from the accident.
In our analysis, we judged observations after the accident to be the critical test in making adjustments for baseline values. We were cautious in adjusting for demographic and other such variables from the situation existing before the accident because of uncertainties in these data. No information was to be had about subsequent migration, and the target population could only be that exposed to the accident and remaining in the district thereafter.
In any case, in the matter of cancers as an outcome, our study sought effects of the accident strictly in one direction. On this ground, there would seem to be reason to adjust for the baseline, but only after a positive effect was observed, and this we did. An apparent effect could always be a consequence merely of the previous distributions of cancer existing in the affected areas. Nonetheless, the data were in the main presented stratified by area for postulated exposure level and by time period. (We see no point in the fuss Wing makes about cancer incidence data from 1975-the first of 5 preaccident years-that we concluded were undercounted. In the absence of detectable geographic bias our decision to include them, and Wing et al's decision to exclude them and adjust their results, are equally justifiable.)
There is neither mystery nor obfuscation in our presentation of the data. We are not sure we can say the same for Wing et al. They charge that we were constrained in our analyses in respect of emissions estimated by the judge's antecedent order. Certainly, we had no direct access to the records of the TMI Utility, but as far as we know, what was available was published. Of course, in using our models Wing et al. (2) operate under exactly the same constraint. We do not see that they find anything of note not reported by us and, indeed, they report rather fewer results than we do and in a less acessible manner.
Contrary to yet another allegation, our recommendation was firm [to the TMI Public Health Fund and also in print (4, 8) ] that a follow-up was needed, both to allow larger numbers of cases to accumulate in the aftermath of the accident and to collect individual level data on possible exposure and confounding.
In sum, then, Wing et al. (2) make assertions about what they take to be proven effects while we are cautious in accepting them as proven. It is a stretch to rate this difference, which your journal has given such prominence, as a controversy. Can it be said, in truth, that by going into contention Wing et al. have advanced the cause ofthe community or the environment? As we see it, they have done no more than muddy the waters.
Response: Science, Public Health, and Objectivity: Research into the Accident at Three Mile Island Although controversies over scientific findings are common, the topic of health effects of ionizing radiation has generated an exceptional amount of heat. Despite a century of research since Roentgen's discovery of X rays, fundamental disagreements exist over biophysical mechanisms, dose-response assumptions, analytical strategies, interspecies extrapolations, and the representativeness of studies of select human populations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) . In the United States, the last decade has seen revelations about human radiation experimentation (8) and a shift in responsibility for radiation health effects research from the Department of Energy to the Department of Health and Human Services, stimulated by concerns over secrecy and conflict of interest (9, 10) . These disagreements have been amplified by public and scientific debates over military, energy, and medical applications of nuclear technology (11) .
As one of the best known technological failures of the nuclear era, the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant has generated its share of controversy, most recently in the pages of Environmental Health Perspectives (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) . In his letter, Susser raises a number of important issues related to the context and logic of research on health effects from the 1979 nuclear accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) (17). We would like to follow his lead by giving some background regarding our involvement in the study of cancer incidence in the 10-mile area around TMI and also respond to some of his specific points regarding the logic and methods of the original study and our reanalysis.
Susser notes that he and his colleagues did not seek the opportunity to study cancer incidence around TMI, but were asked to investigate the accident "on behalf of the TMI Public Health Fund" (17). The Fund, financed by the nuclear industry as a result of a legal settlement, was governed by the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which imposed requirements regarding the conduct of research and the review and approval of reports by attorneys for the industry (1i). We do not suggest that this led Susser and colleagues to alter findings or purposefully construct research to support the industry. However, to the extent that all research is influenced by assumptions and beliefs from the framing of questions to the interpretation of evidence, the context of negotiation with industry representatives is important to understanding the research product.
Like Susser, we did not seek out funding for our reanalysis and, like the original research, our work was conducted in a context that is important to understanding the product. We were asked to review Susser and Hatch's data on cancer incidence by attorneys for approximately 2,000 plaintiffs in a class action suit that was before the same court that administered the TMI Public Health Fund. Civil suits may be a poor way to address public health problems; however, in our society, civil action has played an important role by bringing health issues (including asbestos, tobacco, air and water pollution) to public attention, and has provided some recourse to members of the public seeking protection from powerful industries.
We took a number of measures to reduce the potential for apparent or real conflict of interest in working on research that was related to a lawsuit. Rather than accepting funds directly, we made arrangements for the attorneys to support our reanalysis through a grant from the nonprofit John Snow Institute. The grant was received by our University in the same manner as other grants and covered only the usual salary, computer, communications, and other costs associated with research. We were not paid as consultants, we accepted no conditions about the conduct of our research, and we were free to publish whatever we found to be noteworthy.
Emphasizing his commitment to objectivity and rigor in science, Susser states his concern that our paper is not about controversy (12), but is "a situation manufactured from misconceptions, misinterpretations, mistaken logic and simple error" (17). Here (15) . It should be noted that the hypothesis being evaluated is that the accident led to increases in cancer, a one-sided hypothesis, for which p-values should be divided by two. After a hypothesis is stated and a strong design has been chosen that reduces the potential for confounders to explain the phenomenon (in this case, adjustment for preaccident disease rates), such evidence of a dose-response association generally would be considered as support for the hypothesis.
We argued that the previous investigators did not interpret the evidence as supporting the hypothesis because of errors in the analysis (discussed above) and circular reasoning (13, 15, 16) . Susser (17) notes that their "analyses and results ... derived precisely from the use of relative dose"; our concern, however, has been that their interpretation of the findings was largely in terms of absolute dose. Numerous statements in the paper by Hatch et al. (19) indicate that they assumed the absolute doses were too low to produce the effect being investigated. Their prior expectation, "that no excess cancer would be found," was "based on estimated releases and conventional radiobiology" (19).
Doses calculated from their assumptions about releases were described as "a fraction of the average U.S. exposure of 0.8-1 mSv from natural background radiation in the course of a year" and "very low, an average of approximately 0.1 mSv, with 1 mSv the projected maximal dose" (19). Their conclusion states, "the possibility that emissions from the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant could have contributed to the observed trends, in lung cancer in particular, must be weighed against . . . the low estimates of radiation exposure" (19).
Susser (17) states that to test an a priori hypothesis "precludes circularity" of logic. The problem of circularity, however, arises when a researcher does not accept evidence, collected in the course of research designed to test an alternative hypothesis, as a reason to reject the null hypothesis. It is not "religion" to begin a study with the prior belief that the exposure under study might be a cause of the effect under study; rather it is a necessary part of science. The null hypothesis (that no association exists) must be able to be rejected (that is, one must be able to accept that the exposure could possibly cause the effect), or a study shouldn't be done.
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At our introduction to this study, we felt that if the estimated magnitude of the reported doses was correct, any association between radiation and cancer would be too small to observe with the available data. However, plaintiffs in the civil suit, as well as others, questioned whether the doses received by some people may have been much higher than the reported maximal dose of 1 mSv (20, 22 
